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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREA OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS

Submitted by the

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

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Concurred in by the

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

on 3 July 1956. Concurring were the Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Director of Naval Intelligence; the Director of Intelligence, USAF; and the Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN NORTH KOREA OVER THE NEXT FEW YEARS

THE PROBLEM

To analyze the present strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime and to estimate future developments and trends over the next few years.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The Korean Communist regime will almost certainly retain firm control of North Korea through 1960, and the USSR will probably retain its predominant influence over North Korea's internal and external policies. Communist China probably will continue to make a substantial economic contribution to North Korea and its military forces will continue to be available for the defense of North Korea. Although Communist China will continue to play an important part in the formulation of Bloc policy toward North Korea, we believe it will not attempt to dislodge the USSR as the dominant power there. (*Paras. 50-51*)

2. The objective of the Communists continues to be the gaining of control over the entire Korean peninsula. We believe that they will not resort to force to obtain this objective, at least so long as the US remains committed to the defense of the ROK. However, the Communists will continue their attempts to undermine the ROK through overt and covert political, diplomatic, economic, and propaganda appeals to South Korea for economic, political, and cultural contacts, and for "Korean" measures to bring about unifi-

cation. We believe that in present circumstances the Communists will probably not make substantial progress in these efforts. However, either in the event of the death of Rhee or a decline in US economic and military support, their unification tactics are likely to be accelerated and much more effective. (*Paras. 53-54*)

3. The Communists will probably continue to press for the withdrawal of UN/US forces, and for international negotiations on Korean unification, but they almost certainly will not make any concessions which would weaken their firm hold on North Korea. In fact they would probably accept serious military risks to maintain their position. (*Paras. 52-53*)

4. Despite reductions in over-all strength since the Armistice, Communist armed forces in Korea could still launch a limited attack with little warning. The Chinese Communists will continue to have the unopposed capability to reinforce units in contact along the demarcation line with a maximum of six armies in from 10 to 14 days after the initiation of

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movement from present assembly areas. North Korean armed forces now include a re-equipped and reorganized army of some 350,000 men and an air force with 310 jet fighters (Fagots) and 65 light jet bombers (Beagles). Although the North Korean ground force is well below the strength of the 650,000-man ROK army and may undergo a strength reduction of 80,000 this year, North Korean air force strength is far superior to that of the ROK. (*Paras. 40, 42, 48-49*)

5. The Chinese Communists have steadily reduced their troop strength in Korea and now have less than 300,000 men in the area. The chances are about even that Chinese Communists will complete the withdrawal of their troops within the next year or so in order to enhance the independent appearance of the North Korean regime and to increase pressure on the US/UN command to complete its withdrawal. However, the Chinese Communists may wish to retain some troops

in North Korea in order to maintain political influence in the area and a rough parity of ground force strength with the ROK.¹ (*Paras. 44, 52*)

6. Although living standards remain extremely low in North Korea, rehabilitation of the severely damaged industrial and agricultural industries is well advanced. With substantial material and manpower assistance from the Bloc, industrial output is rising and will probably reach 1949 levels in most sectors by the end of 1956. By 1961 the North Korean economy will probably be able to make a modest contribution to the Bloc's economic potential in the Far East in the fields of metals, chemicals, and electric power. However, a serious manpower shortage, lagging production in agriculture, and lack of adequate consumer goods industry will continue beyond 1956 to hamper efforts to raise living standards and to increase the regime's appeal in the ROK. (*Paras. 27-29, 33-38*)

DISCUSSION

I. INTRODUCTION

7. North Korea is a Communist Satellite similar to the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe. Under the direction and control of Soviet officials and Soviet occupation troops, Korean Communist leaders in the period 1945-1948 developed an all-powerful Communist party, extreme centralization of authority, detailed supervision and control of nearly all aspects of national life, stringent internal security controls, and a governmental structure with power concentrated in the Cabinet. Despite the near total destruction of the North Korean army and economy during the Korean War, the regime has emerged with its basic structure and control unimpaired.

8. The primary objectives of the Communists in North Korea have been to build a strong regime, to develop and maintain an effective

military organization, to develop a strong socialized economy closely inter-related with that of the Bloc, and to unify Korea under

¹ The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that the factors impinging on a Chinese Communist military withdrawal from Korea are so uncertain as to make it impossible to estimate that the chances are about even that complete withdrawal will occur within the next year or so. Although such a move would conform with the Communists' current "peaceful" pose, such factors as Chinese Communist interest in maintaining influence in North Korea, Chinese Communist commitment of military labor in Korea as a contribution to North Korean rehabilitation, possible Soviet uneasiness about the strength of the North Korean forces at this stage of development, and the desirability of timing a military withdrawal in such a way as to gain maximum political advantage may militate against complete withdrawal in the immediate future.

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Communist control. The importance of North Korea to the Bloc was emphasized by the entry of Communist China into the Korean War despite the risks of a broadened conflict, by the large scale military effort during the hostilities, and by the economic and technical assistance extended since the Armistice. From the point of view of the Bloc, loss of North Korea would be a serious blow to Communist prestige elsewhere and would greatly increase the vulnerability of Manchuria and the Soviet Far East to US and Japanese pressures. North Korea is also important to the Sino-Soviet Bloc as an instrument for the extension of Communist control throughout the peninsula, a development which in turn would enhance Communist prospects in Japan. The Bloc also has an interest in the development of the modest North Korean economic potential.

II. POLITICAL RELATIONSHIPS

Chinese and Soviet Influence in North Korea

9. The Chinese Communists probably have had a considerable voice in the development of Bloc policy toward North Korea since 1950, but we believe that the USSR retains its paramount position in North Korean affairs. Leadership and control remain firmly in the hands of the Koreans brought into Korea by the USSR in 1945. Soviet influence remains predominant in the North Korean armed forces. Soviet advisers retain the direction of economic planning and there apparently are no Chinese Communist advisers at the ministerial level or in other top policy positions. Although the monetary value of Communist China's aid to North Korea apparently exceeds that of the USSR, the Soviet contribution to the economy is probably of greater long run significance, as a large proportion of Soviet aid is for the reconstruction of basic industries, whereas the greater share of China's aid is in the form of consumer goods and the rehabilitation of buildings and transport facilities. Technicians from the USSR work in practically all types of industrial installations as well as in agriculture and city

planning, whereas Communist China has limited its contributions of technical personnel largely to railroads, light industry, and building construction. Additional indications that the Soviet Union retains its pre-eminent position include: the Russian language is more widely taught than Chinese; more Korean students are in school in the USSR than in China; and the North Korean press and radio propaganda credits the Soviet Union with primary responsibility for progress in North Korea.

Communist Organization in North Korea

10. The Soviet Union has exercised its authority and pursued its objectives in North Korea through key members of the Korean Labor Party (the Communist Party in North Korea). Party members usually serve in the dual capacity of party and government officials and thus are in control of the government at all levels.

11. Three groups of Korean Communists appeared on the scene immediately upon the removal of Japanese control. A "domestic" group consisted of the Communist revolutionaries who had remained in Korea during the Japanese occupation. Another and the most numerous group was the Koreans who returned home from the Communist-held areas in North China. The most influential group, however, was that which entered Korea in the fall of 1945 with the Soviet army directly from the USSR. This latter group was composed of former Korean partisans who had fled Manchuria around 1940, and Korean colonists in the Uzbek SSR and the Kazakh SSR (known as Soviet-Koreans). Many of the Soviet-Koreans who accompanied the Soviet army had been long-term residents and citizens of the USSR. Some had been trained in Soviet technical and political schools, were members of the Soviet Communist Party, and had government experience in the Soviet Union.

12. In October 1945, Kim Il-sung, an ex-partisan who had returned to Korea as a captain in the Soviet army, was placed at the top of the Korean Communist Party structure, and returnees from the USSR entered the party

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organization at the central and provincial levels. The returnees from China ("Yenan" group) at first formed their own group, but in August 1946 they were absorbed in the newly formed North Korean Labor Party. Although some of the "Yenan" group held positions of prominence in the new party, none apparently held positions of great political power. Kim Il-sung and the late Ho Ka-i, a former Soviet Communist Party official, emerged as the chief figures in the party and government.

13. The "domestic" group in the meantime had attempted to operate in South Korea as the South Korean Labor Party but its leaders were forced to flee into the Soviet zone. In 1949 the South Korean and North Korean Labor Parties were merged to form the Korean Labor Party with control firmly in the hands of Kim Il-sung and his group.

14. The power and authority of the Korean Labor Party and its prewar leadership remained intact during and following the Korean War. Since the war, the "domestic" group has been denounced and most of its leaders have been eliminated or removed, and the "Yenan" group has gained no ground. The Third Party Congress, meeting in April 1956, gave formal public approval to the measures taken by the Central Committee to rid the party of "cliques" and "undesirable elements," and warned against the survival of factionalism. Although the Congress commended the party leaders for strictly adhering to the principle of "collective leadership," Kim Il-sung appears to dominate both the party and the government.

15. It is difficult to evaluate the North Korean leadership since Soviet advisers have always participated heavily in both the processes of decision and the implementation of policy. With this assistance the leadership has effectively exploited the country's manpower and resources. However, the leaders have demonstrated little of the flexibility and skill of the Chinese or Vietnamese Communists in adapting Communist theory to local conditions. Unlike Ho Chi Minh, for example, North Korean leaders have not emerged as the center of

a national movement with a defensible claim to popular support, and have established no distinctively Korean character in the state which they created. Loyalty to the USSR and political dependability have been the prime criteria for the selection of government leaders and administrative personnel.

Dissidence and Resistance

16. The great majority of the North Koreans probably dislike the regime and appear to respond apathetically to its demands and appeals. The top leaders are too obviously agents of the Soviet Union to command full respect as "Korean" leaders. There appears to be chronic resentment against heavy taxes, collectivization, low living standards, and government controls. However, there is no evidence of the existence of any significant organized resistance to the regime, either overt or covert. The Internal Security Forces, assisted by local police units, maintain close surveillance over the population, which is organized into groups of five families. It is highly unlikely that resistance groups could be organized which could take effective action against the regime. Although there would probably be some positive resistance action in the event of a resumption of hostilities, it would almost certainly not be widespread or effective.

Relations with the non-Bloc World

17. From the time of its formal establishment in 1948, the North Korean regime has claimed to be the legitimate government for the whole of the peninsula, and the Supreme People's Assembly, elected in August 1948, includes deputies allegedly chosen by clandestine elections in South Korea. Although the tactical emphases of the regime's unification line have changed from time to time, the basic claim has not. The area now under the control of the regime is normally officially referred to as "the northern half" and the government of the ROK is usually termed the "Rhee bandit clique." The current Communist official position on unification, enunciated at the Geneva Conference in 1954, proposes that a commission representing both North and South Korea be established. This commission, in which

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the Communists would have an effective veto, would supervise elections and exercise some controls over the whole country before the elections. Although the Communist claims and their program for unification have had little effect in South Korea, the Communists have persisted with their line in an apparent effort to keep before the world their claim as the legitimate government of all Korea, and to conform to the universal Korean aspiration for unification.

18. In the meantime, North Korea continues its generally ineffective attempts to weaken and eventually to subvert the ROK by organization of Communist cells and the conduct of espionage in South Korea, by propaganda aimed at the South Koreans, and by frequent appeals to South Koreans for economic, political, and cultural contacts.

19. Despite continuing efforts to obtain international recognition, North Korea has no formal diplomatic relations with any non-Bloc country, and almost no contacts outside the Bloc except with groups in Japan. The Communists probably hope that by developing North Korean contacts with Japan they can increase ROK distrust of Japan and hamper US efforts to develop ROK-Japanese cooperation. Like Communist China and the USSR, North Korea has attempted to woo Japan through exploitation of Japanese interest in fishing rights, in the repatriation of Japanese nationals still in Communist areas, and in trade. A Japanese Red Cross team visited North Korea in February 1956 to negotiate the repatriation of Japanese nationals. However, the Japanese have shown little interest in trade relations.

20. North Korea's principal lever in exerting its influence in Japan is the 600,000 to 800,000 Koreans living there. A significant number of these are active Communists and probably a majority are Communist sympathizers. The Japanese, however, are gradually bringing this minority under control and its potential as a threat to internal security and civil order is steadily declining.

21. The North Korean regime has consistently ignored UN resolutions calling for the unifica-

tion of Korea through free elections and failed to respond to UN cease-fire demands at the outset of the Korean War. Its noncooperation with international bodies was extended to the work of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. The inspection teams in North Korea, which have now been transferred to the Demilitarized Zone, were restricted in their movements and not permitted to observe the introduction of aircraft and new type weapons into the area.

III. ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

22. The Japanese invested heavily in rail lines, communication systems, and industrial plant in the northern part of the Korean peninsula to take advantage of the iron ore, low grade anthracite, graphite, nonferrous ores, water power, and timber resources in that area. Light industries and the production of consumer goods were not developed and northern Korea's primary role was to supply raw materials, semiprocessed metal products, power and chemicals to Korea, Japan, and Manchuria. The Japanese controlled nearly all of the industry in North Korea and provided the bulk of the skilled labor and management. The principal Korean contribution to the industrial development was the unskilled and semiskilled labor force.

23. The North Korean economic pattern was not altered significantly following the Soviet occupation in 1945, except that the output of the raw materials and heavy industries was exported to the Soviet Union. Investment was concentrated in mining and heavy industry and the USSR gave material assistance only to those segments of the economy which contributed directly to Soviet needs. Offices of a number of Soviet government agencies were established in North Korea, and Soviet political and technical advisers were attached to the ministries and the major industrial plants. Although North Korea remained barely self-sufficient in food, widespread shortages in other consumer goods soon developed with the cutting off of contacts with former suppliers in Japan and South Korea.

24. During the Korean War, North Korea's industrial plant was largely destroyed, and

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the rail and highway systems and urban housing were severely damaged. Agricultural production was severely disrupted by extreme destruction of livestock, irrigation facilities, and many of the grain storage bins, and by an acute shortage of farm labor, implements, and chemical fertilizers. North Korea became one of the most destitute areas in Asia.

25. Moreover, the Korean War intensified the country's manpower problems. We believe the population dropped during the Korean War to slightly less than eight million people, or about 13 percent below the estimated pre-hostilities level. The proportion of the population in the work age group is probably well below normal and females are believed to outnumber males by a ratio of three to two. Military levies further reduce the labor force available to the civilian economy. More important, however, is the serious and continuing shortage of technically qualified personnel.

26. Immediately following the Armistice, a Three Year Plan of reconstruction was adopted which, with the exception of the nonferrous metals and chemical industries, would generally restore industrial production, by the end of 1956, to the 1949 levels (the highest levels achieved under Communist management and supervision but still below peak Japanese production during World War II). Investment and manpower resources were to be concentrated on reconstructing heavy industry. The original plan also called for the production, in 1956, of 3.27 million tons of food crops, 1.05 million tons over the 1949 level. In addition, preparation of a Five Year Plan for the general development of industry for the period 1957-1961 was begun.

27. North Korea apparently will fulfill many of the industrial goals set in the Three Year Plan, and probably will exceed these goals in the fields of railroad transport, electric power, and ferrous metals. Trends in the industrial sector and some of the short and long range goals are shown in Table 1, page 7.

28. Although housing construction and production of most consumers goods has been emphasized in North Korean pronouncements, performance and actual investment in this

area have remained far below requirements. In the case of cotton textiles, for example, production is still less than half of current consumption. Substantial imports of consumers goods including food, mainly from Communist China, have been necessary in order to maintain a bare subsistence. In addition food and most other consumers goods are rationed and money wages are supplemented by a grain allowance.

29. In 1955 the government made strenuous attempts to increase agricultural production through incentive rewards for overfulfilling food production quotas, and reduction in agricultural taxes-in-kind. Although the 1955 food crop harvest was reported to be larger than that of 1954, severe drought in the west coast provinces, inefficient management of farm cooperatives, and a lack of adequate irrigation facilities and chemical fertilizers, prevented fulfillment of the grain production quota. As a result, the 1956 production goal of 3.27 million metric tons of food crops has been revised downward by some 500,000 metric tons.

30. All major industrial and commercial enterprises were nationalized soon after 1945, but little progress was made in the collectivization of agriculture before the Korean War. Since 1953 the regime has attempted the rapid formation of cooperatives in agriculture, not only to bring this sector in line with the rest of the economy, but also in the hope of rationalizing the use of the short labor supply, of gaining better control over output, and of increasing farm productivity. Only about one-third of the farmland in North Korea is still being cultivated by noncollectivized farmers.

Sino-Soviet Bloc Assistance

31. Progress in rehabilitation has been possible only because of extensive Bloc financial, material, and technical assistance. In 1954 and 1955, total Bloc aid, valued at official exchange rates, amounted to \$470 million. Neither prices nor exchange rates prevailing in these transactions are known. Official exchange rates considerably overvalue the dollar amount of aid listed below. The value of

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TABLE 1

Estimated and Planned Production of Selected Commodities in North Korea
1944, 1949, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1961

Commodity	Unit	1944 ¹	1949 ²	1954 ²	1955 ²	1956 ²		1961 ²
		Estimated Actual Production	Estimated Actual Production	Estimated Actual Production	Estimated Actual Production	Three Year Plan	Estimated Production	Five Year Plan
Electric power (capacity)	Million kw	na	1.35	1	1.3	1.35	1.35	--
Electric power (production)	Billion kwh	7.5-8	5.9	2	3	3.8	4.3	8.5
Coal	Million mt	6.1	4	2.1	4	4	5	8.5
Iron ore	Thousand mt	3,200	400	140	480	na	820	--
Pig iron	Thousand mt	525	166	61	160	180	265	500-550
Crude steel	Thousand mt	150	145	50	175	na	200	525-600
Finished steel	Thousand mt	88	108	38	132	na	150	400-450
Metallurgical coke	Thousand mt	na	268	Negligible	130	200	200	--
Cement	Thousand mt	958	537	400	510	650	585	1,000-1,500
Copper (refined)	Thousand mt	na	5.6	1	3	na	3.5	--
Lead (refined)	Thousand mt	na	9.4	1	6	na	7	--
Zinc (refined)	Thousand mt	na	8	Negligible	1	na	2	--
Chemical fer- tilizers	Thousand mt	500	400	5	30	150	150	400
Cotton fabric	Million lm	na	9.4	23	38	48	48	--

¹ The peak production year under Japanese rule.

² Production estimates represent only a general order of magnitude. They are based on North Korean announcements and upon our estimates of the production potential of some plant and mining facilities.

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the nonmilitary items delivered in 1954 and 1955 by the USSR apparently approximated US \$189 million of which some 75 percent consisted of capital goods and the remainder of consumer goods. During the same period Chinese Communist goods delivered to North Korea approximated US \$215 million of which about 55 percent consisted of food and clothing. Announced value of aid delivered from the European Satellites during 1954 and 1955 was US \$65.5 million. According to the announced North Korean budget, total Sino-Soviet Bloc aid accounted for about 29 percent of the regime's total receipts in 1954 and for about 21 percent of the total receipts in 1955.

32. Bloc countries have also alleviated the adverse effects of the manpower shortage. There are probably some 5,000 Bloc civilian technical personnel working in North Korea, including about 1,500 from the USSR, 1,800 from Communist China, and 1,700 from the European Satellites. Moreover, large numbers of Chinese Communist troops and laborers have been used in rebuilding bridges, public buildings and housing, and restoring the railroad transportation system. Chinese Communist personnel were also recruited for work in agriculture, light industry, and handicraft industries during 1954 and 1955.

Economic Prospects

33. The goals of the new Five Year Plan (1957-1961) which were announced at the Third Congress of the Korean Labor Party in April 1956, are consistent with estimated current trends of economic development. Barring a renewal of hostilities in Korea or a major political upheaval in the Far East, the Communists probably will achieve substantial success in implementing the plan. Continued Sino-Soviet Bloc material aid and technical and manpower assistance will be required, but such aid will probably increasingly take the form of credits rather than grants. Trade with Bloc countries will probably increase.

34. Under the Five Year Plan, heavy industry will continue to receive the major share of expenditures for development and reconstruction. Investment in the expansion of non-ferrous mines and smelters will continue to

receive a high priority. Although electric power production is still below existing capacity, nevertheless it is more than ample to meet present requirements and large amounts are being transmitted to Communist China. The major investment in the chemical industry probably will continue to be in the expansion of nitrogenous chemical facilities, particularly those used in the production of fertilizers. A modest engineering industry is planned, capable of producing agricultural implements, textile and mining machinery, automotive parts, hand tools, and low-precision machine tools.

35. Construction and expansion of consumer goods plant facilities beyond those contemplated in the Three Year Plan (1954-1956) probably will be slight. Instead, greater emphasis probably will be placed on utilizing existing plant facilities more intensively and on raising labor productivity. With continued Bloc technical assistance, by the end of 1961 North Korea probably will be producing consumer goods such as cotton and silk textiles, rubber shoes, and paper at a rate well in excess of 1956 levels.

36. Although mismanagement and apathy on the part of members of cooperatives may continue to hamper agricultural production, the increased use of chemical fertilizers, insecticides, and better quality seeds, combined with improved irrigation facilities, may permit North Korea to achieve its Five Year Plan goal of self-sufficiency in basic food requirements. Agriculture will probably be fully collectivized by the end of 1961.

37. As a result of continued technical education, indigenous skilled labor may be capable by 1961 of assuming many of the technical industrial positions held by Bloc technicians. However, the shortage of indigenous manpower and skills is likely to persist as the higher production program of the Five Year Plan goes into effect.

38. In general we believe that North Korea will make gradual economic progress over the next few years, subject to the limitations imposed by an apathetic population, administrative inefficiency, and Communist planning. Improvement in the material welfare of the

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people will probably lag considerably behind industrial development because of the regime's unwillingness to allocate substantial resources for the import or production of consumer goods. By 1961 the North Korean economy will probably have gained sufficient strength in the metals and chemical industries and in electric power production to make a modest contribution to the economic potential of the Bloc in the Far East.

IV. MILITARY STRENGTH

39. Communist armed forces in North Korea, which now total approximately 640,000, consist of Chinese Communist army units and the armed forces of North Korea. The latter are maintained, supported, and controlled by the Soviet Union. The North Korean armed forces have steadily increased in strength and quality since the Armistice.² There has been a gradual reduction in the Chinese Communist strength, and today the Chinese forces constitute less than one-half of the Communist ground forces in North Korea.

North Korean Army

40. The strength of the North Korean army (NKA) currently is estimated at 350,000 (estimated at 281,000 at the time of the Armistice), organized into three army groups composed of six corps of 18 infantry divisions, plus seven infantry brigades, eight tank regiments, and a tank brigade of unknown strength and organization. Three corps and one division are deployed in positions along the Demilitarized Zone. (See map.) Three corps minus one division and the seven infantry brigades are deployed in the rear and coastal areas. The Internal Security Forces under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with a strength of about 16,000 men, are equipped, trained, and organized along army lines and accordingly are included in the figure for army strength. The manpower shortage would probably limit the personnel strength

² Since the Armistice the Communist side has built new airfields in North Korea and has brought in jet aircraft and improved types of other weapons not present at the time the Armistice went into effect.

of the NKA during the period of this estimate to about 375,000.

41. We consider the combat effectiveness of the NKA fair. Substantial improvement in organization, training, and standardization of equipment has been achieved since the termination of hostilities in 1953. Moreover, there have been significant improvements in the transportation system and in organic unit firepower. Most of the senior officers have had combat experience and we believe that leadership is good at the top level of command and within the major subordinate units. However, we believe that leadership is only fair at lower levels, since most junior officers and many of the front-line troops have had little or no combat experience.

North Korean Air Force

42. The North Korean air force (NKAF) has about 17,500 personnel and 525 aircraft in the following categories:

Jet fighters (Fagots)	250
Jet ground attack (Fagots)	60
Jet light bombers (Beagles)	65
Piston fighters (not in operational units)	40
Piston ground attack (Beasts)	40
Piston light bombers	30
Transports	10
Miscellaneous aircraft	30

Only the jet aircraft are considered first line equipment. The bulk of the strength of the NKAF is deployed in a narrow corridor paralleling the west coast of North Korea and extending from Uiju to Pyongyang, and at Wonsan on the east coast. (See map.) The jet and conventional light bombers of one air division are based in Kungchuling, Manchuria. North Korea has nine operational airfields and at least 22 other fields in varying conditions of serviceability of which 12 can be developed for jet use.

North Korean Navy

43. The North Korean navy consists of an estimated 7,000 men and approximately 100 small craft including 6-12 PT boats, 20 armed motor launches, and eight wooden hulled ex-fishing craft equipped for minesweeping. The remain-

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der are wooden junks used for coastal patrol or for rudimentary minelaying operations.

Chinese Communist Forces in North Korea

44. Since the Armistice the Chinese Communists have employed a rotation system combined with a policy of gradual reduction of the total Chinese strength in North Korea from the high of 872,000 in 1953. Fourteen Chinese Communist armies have been withdrawn since 1953, of which four were withdrawn in 1955. The currently estimated strength of the Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) in Korea is about 290,000, organized into five armies (15 infantry divisions), two field artillery divisions, one rocket-launcher division, three anti-tank regiments, four AAA regiments, four armored regiments and service troops. It has three armies of nine divisions deployed along the Demilitarized Zone and two armies located in rear areas. Although many of the Chinese Communist troops now in Korea have had relatively little or no combat experience the combat effectiveness, leadership, and morale of the CCF in Korea are good.

Logistics

45. The transportation system in North Korea has been rehabilitated. This has permitted an improvement in supply procedures for the armed forces including a reduction in large forward stockpiles. The Chinese Communist and North Korean logistic systems apparently are linked and coordinated at the general headquarters level. We believe that the Communists are currently capable of logistically supporting prolonged large scale military operations in Korea.

46. The USSR furnishes the bulk of North Korea's military equipment, particularly all major ordnance items such as tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Communist China has provided light items such as clothing and individual equipment, and the European Satellites have furnished some medical supplies, electronic and signal equipment, and some vehicles. North Korean industry can partially fill the requirements for small arms and small arms ammunition, hand grenades and land mines, and small naval craft of less than 1,000 tons.

Soviet Influence in North Korean Armed Forces

47. Soviet influence is predominant in the North Korean armed forces despite the participation of large numbers of Chinese troops in the Korean War and their continued presence in strength since the Armistice. This dominance is reflected in the striking similarity of the organization, logistics, and tactics of the NKA to those of the Soviet ground forces, in the continued reliance on the Soviet Union as the major source of equipment, and in the continued employment of Soviet advisers at all important levels in all three services. The preservation of Soviet influence is facilitated by the fact that many Korean officers are in fact Soviet citizens, and in some instances veterans of the Red Army.

Military Capabilities

48. The NKA is outnumbered almost two to one by the ROK and is inferior in artillery and heavy weapons, and its navy is considerably inferior to the ROK navy. The NKA, however, has now become a modern combat force which is numerically and qualitatively superior to the ROKAF.

49. North Korean armed forces in concert with the Chinese Communist forces now in Korea are capable of launching a limited offensive with little warning. The Chinese Communists will continue to have the unopposed capability to reinforce units in contact along the demarcation line with a maximum of six armies in from 10 to 14 days after the initiation of movement from present assembly areas. However, without external support, the NKA is incapable of any sustained military operations.

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50. It is unlikely that there will be a fundamental change in the regime's control and leadership. Although the North Korean people will probably continue to harbor extensive grievances against the regime, these grievances will have little effect on the regime's firm internal control and stability. Nationalistic pressures for a modification of the re-

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gime's subservience to the USSR are likely to be relatively slight. However, the USSR may consider it desirable to give the North Korean regime an appearance of greater independence, in part to enhance the North Korean appeal in the South.

51. The USSR is likely to retain the allegiance of North Korean leaders and its predominance in North Korea during the period of this estimate. Communist China probably will continue to make a substantial economic contribution in North Korea, and her military forces will continue to be available for the defense of North Korea. Despite these factors and the long history of Chinese suzerainty in Korea, we believe that Peiping will not jeopardize its over-all relationship with the USSR by seeking to gain narrow advantage in Korea at the expense of the Soviet position.

52. The Chinese Communists will probably continue to reduce the strength of their forces in Korea, and the chances appear about even that they will complete their withdrawal within the next year or so. An early and complete withdrawal would be consistent with the "peaceful" pose of the Bloc and the Communists might expect thereby to hasten the withdrawal of all US/UN forces and possibly improve the chances for subversion within the ROK. The Communists probably realize, however, that their withdrawal would have much less effect in generating pressures within South Korea for similar US action than did the unilateral Soviet withdrawal in 1948. Moreover, the Chinese Communists may have their own political reasons for wishing to maintain some forces in North Korea, and the USSR may feel that the North Korean armed forces will not be sufficiently strong by the end of another year to justify the withdrawal of all Chinese troops.³

53. Although the Communists will probably continue to press for negotiations on Korean unification, they will almost certainly be unwilling to make any concessions which would weaken their firm hold on North Korea. They would almost certainly accept serious risks to maintain the North Korean regime and to


retain control of North Korea. On the other hand, the Communists almost certainly estimate that repetition of their attack on South Korea would lead to strong US/UN military counteraction, and they will probably continue unwilling to take significant risks to obtain control of the South. We believe that so long as the US remains committed to the defense of the ROK, another Communist attack against South Korea is highly unlikely.

54. The Communists will continue their overt and covert attempts to undermine the ROK, and at the same time bend all efforts to strengthen the international position of the North Korean regime. They will continue to exploit the desire of all Koreans for political unity by attempting to appear as the champions of peaceful political unification, by calling for "Korean" measures to bring about unification, and by portraying ROK leaders and the US as the main stumbling blocks to these aspirations. They will probably increase their appeals to South Koreans for economic, political, and cultural contacts. The Communists probably do not expect success in their efforts at unification during the lifetime of President Rhee, but they probably estimate that political uncertainty and weakness will develop following his death. They may also believe that the US interest in Korea will gradually decline. In either of these situations their unification tactics are likely to be accelerated and much more effective.

³ The Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State, believes that the factors impinging on a Chinese Communist military withdrawal from Korea are so uncertain as to make it impossible to estimate that the chances are about even that complete withdrawal will occur within the next year or so. Although such a move would conform with the Communists' current "peaceful" pose, such factors as Chinese Communist interest in maintaining influence in North Korea, Chinese Communist commitment of military labor in Korea as a contribution to North Korean rehabilitation, possible Soviet uneasiness about the strength of the North Korean forces at this stage of development, and the desirability of timing a military withdrawal in such a way as to gain maximum political advantage may militate against complete withdrawal in the immediate future.

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